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Abstract: We report a free-space entanglement-based quantum key dis-
tribution experiment, implementing the biased basis protocol between two
sites which are 15.3 km apart. Photon pairs from a polarization-entangled
source are distributed through two 7.8-km free-space optical links. An
optimal bias 20:80 between the X and Z basis is used. A post-processing
scheme with finite-key analysis is applied to extract the final secure key.
After three-hour continuous operation at night, a 4293-bit secure key is
obtained, with a final key rate of 0.124 bit per raw key bit which increases
the final key rate by 14.8% comparing to the standard BB84 case. Our
results experimentally demonstrate that the efficient BB84 protocol, which
increases key generation efficiency by biasing Alice and Bob’s basis
choices, is potentially useful for the ground-satellite quantum communica-
tion.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an approach of information-theoretically secure key
extension between two remote parties, Alice and Bob, based on the fundamental principles of
quantum mechanics. There are two types of QKD schemes: one is the prepare-and-measure
scheme, such as the Bennett-Brassard-1984 (BB84) protocol [1] and the Bennett-1992 proto-
col [2]; the other is the entanglement-based scheme, such as the Ekert-1991 protocol [3] and
the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin-1992 (BBM92) protocol [4]. Since the first QKD experimental
demonstration in the early 1990s [5], QKD has rapidly developed towards the stage for real-life
applications [6].
Generally speaking, there are mainly two types of quantum channels, fiber links and free-
space links. Considering absorptive channel losses and detector dark counts, the distances of
current fiber-based QKD experiments are limited to hundreds of kilometers [7–9]. For free-
space links, on the other hand, the photon losses and photon decoherence are almost negligible
in outer space, thus the ground-satellite QKD offers a promising way to run large-scale quantum
communication schemes [10]. Along this line, the free-space quantum communication systems
have been successfully demonstrated over large scale distances [11–13], with more practical
and compact systems [14]. Recently, a series of experimental demonstrations are presented for
feasibility tests of ground-satellite quantum key distribution [15, 16] and teleportation [17, 18].
In the BB84 protocol, Alice prepares qubits in the X or Z basis randomly and sends them to
Bob, who measures randomly in one of the two bases. In the original proposal, Alice and Bob
both choose two bases with equal probabilities (50:50). Thus, in the basis-sift procedure, they
have to discard half of the detection events (i.e., the basis-sift factor is 1/2). Later, Lo, Chau
and Ardehali proposed an efficient version of the BB84 protocol [19], in which Alice and Bob
choose two bases, the X and the Z, unevenly (with a bias) to increase the basis-sift factor. In the
infinite-key-size limit, this efficient BB84 protocol can improve the basis-sift factor from 1/2 to
1, compared to the original BB84. The efficient BB84 protocol can be naturally extended to its
entanglement-based version, the BBM92 protocol [4].
The first local experimental demonstration of the efficient BB84 in laboratory was presented
in 2009 [20], where the bias was simulated by introducing extra losses in one of the bases. In
practice, such kind of biased setup cannot increase the QKD efficiency. In our experiment, the
efficient BB84 protocol is demonstrated by actively changing the ratio of two bases, which can
increase the final key rate by 14.8% comparing to the standard BB84 case.
In this paper, we report a free-space entanglement-based QKD experiment using a parametric
down-conversion (PDC) source. The distances between the PDC source and two receivers are
both above 7.8 km which is comparable to the effective thickness of the atmosphere. Further-
more, the efficient BB84 protocol [19] is implemented in our QKD experiment. In the evalua-
tion of the final secure key, we apply a post-processing scheme with finite-key analysis [21,22].
In Section 2, we describe the experiment setup and implementation details. In Section 3, we
present the data postprocessing with finite-key analysis. We finally conclude in Section 4 with
discussions.
2. Experimental implementation
We establish two free-space optical links among three sites, two receiver stations on two sides
and one transmitter in the middle, near Qinghai Lake in China. The main purpose of this exper-
iment is to implement a free-space entanglement-based QKD with the efficient BB84 scheme.
2.1. Experimental setup
At the transmitter, sited in the lawn of a local family near Qinghai Lake, the core equipment
is a compact entanglement source (45× 30 cm2) which utilizes a periodically poled KTiOPO4
(ppKTP) crystal in a polarization-based Sagnac interferometer. By a continuous wave (CW)
pump laser with a power of 12 mW, the PDC source can generate around 107 entangled pairs per
second with a central wavelength of 811 nm. In a 3 ns coincidence time window, about 5×105
photon pairs per second is detected locally with long-pass filters (with cutoff wavelengths at 488
nm). The full width at half maximum (FWHM) of the generated photon pairs is about 0.2 nm.
Two commercial Kepler telescopes with 80 mm diameter was used to transmit the entangled
photon pairs to two receiver sites, respectively.
The two receiver sites, 15.3 km apart, are located 7.8 km away from the transmitter, as
shown in Fig. 1. At Alice’s receiver, settled in an observation platform of a hillside, we use a
commercial 127-mm-diameter telescope to collect the entangled photons flying from the PDC
source. At Bob’s receiver, we use an off-axis parabolic telescope with a diameter of 400 mm.
The collected photons are coupled into 105-µm-diameter multimode fibers with 0.22 numerical
apertures, and then detected by two single-photon counting modules (SPCMs) single-photon
detectors. We separate the synchronization light (1064 nm) from the entangled photons (811
nm) via the dichroic mirror (DM) at both receivers. A 3 nm narrow-band filter is used in front
of each collimator to reduce the background noise. With the combined effect of the DM and the
filter, the background rate of each detector is less than 100 counts per second. In addition, we
utilize wireless bridge to exchange classical information between Alice and Bob.
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Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of the entanglement-based QKD setup. At the transmitter,
a Sagnac PDC source generates entangled photon pairs. Two 80-mm-diameter telescopes
are used to transmit photon pairs to two receiver sites, 7.8 km away from the transmitter
each. The detector modules, employed in both receivers, consist of a Pockels Cell (PoC),
a polarization beam splitter cube (PBS) with two collimators placed in the transmitted and
the reflected output port of PBS.
In both receivers, Pockels Cells (PoCs), composed of potassium dideuterium phosphate
(KD*P) crystals, are used to actively choosing polarization measurement bases. In order to
make the PoC work as a switchable half-wave plate (HWP) for the basis choice (X or Z basis),
we align the optical axis of PoC to 22.5◦ in front of a polarization beam splitter (PBS).
2.2. Basis bias setting
On the receiver end, as shown in Fig. 1, we use a PoC to actively choose the measurement ba-
sis. The tailored logic modules (LM) contains a quantum random number generater (QRNG),
a complex programmable logic device (CPLD) chip and a single-chip microcomputer. The
QRNG, with a maximum generation rate of 4 MHz, controls a PoC to actively choose polar-
ization measurement basis. The advantage of using active basis choice is that we can set an
arbitrary basis bias flexibly. For the passive method, on the other hand, we need a specialized
biased beam splitter, whose bias is normally fixed, for the efficient BB84 protocol.
Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of LM. The first function of LM is choosing a basis bias.
We load a 10-bit random number from the QRNG into buffer memory of our LM, denoted by
Nr, and compare it to reference number, N0. If Nr > N0, LM outputs logic “1”, and else outputs
logic “0”. Then the expected probability of outputting random number “1” is
Prob(ak = 1) = N0× 2−10. (1)
Now we can control the sifting factor q through changing the number N0. The controlling
accuracy depends on the number of random bits to generate N0.
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Fig. 2. A Logic Module is applied for controlling the Pockels Cells, switching polarization
bases and outputting measurement results. Commercial QRNGs are applied to choosing
measurement basis. The logical operation and the human-computer interface are realized
via a CPLD (Complex programmable logic device) chip and a Single-Chip Microcomputer.
The second function of LM is to distinguish the detected photons between four polarization
states. The LM outputs a low-voltage modulation signal into a high-voltage pulser (HV1000) to
switch the PoCs between half-wave voltage (about +600V) and biased voltage (about +100V).
Part of the low-voltage modulation signal, which contains the basis information, and the output
signal from APDs, which contains the bit information, are processed into one of the four states
00,01,10,11, representing the quantum states |H〉 , |V 〉 , |+〉 , |−〉, respectively. The final result
is recoded using a time-to-digital converter (TDC), as shown in Fig. 2.
2.3. Synchronization
In order to achieve a high signal-to-noise ratio, we need a narrow coincidence time window to
reduce the background count rate. We use a high-accuracy TDC to record the arrival time of the
entangled photons at both receivers. For coarse synchronization, we employ the global position
system (GPS). Then, we mainly follow the fine synchronization method used in [13]. Finally,
we observe a coincidence peak with a FWHM around 1 ns. Coincidence time window of 2.5 ns
is used in the postprocessing of this experiment (see Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. The coincident detection events between Alice and Bob in a 25-min continuous
sampling test. After balancing the number of coincident events and the source visibility,
we set the gate width to be 2.5 ns in our experiment.
3. Postprocessing and result
The experiment lasted for nearly 3 hours at nighttime, with 10206 seconds of effective QKD
time. During the process, the average channel loss, taking into account of the transmitting
and collection efficiency of the telescopes, the free-space channel loss and the fiber coupling
efficiency, is around 50 dB, including 29 dB loss of Alice’s optical link and 21 dB of Bob’s. Note
that there is an extra 1∼2 dB loss introduced by gate coincidence match and synchronization.
By considering the balance between the signal-to-noise ratio and the raw key size, we set the
coinciding time-gate to be 2.5 ns. The results of the postprocessing are shown in Tab. 1.
In the calculation of the final secure key length, we employ the post-processing method pro-
posed in [21], taking into account the finite-key size effect. As pointed in [21], the number of
secure key bits cost in authentication, error verification, and the efficiency of privacy amplifi-
cation is in the order of hundreds of bits. Thus, we neglect this part in our final key evaluation.
Define ebx (δpx) and ebz (δpz) to be the bit (phase) error rates in the X and Z bases, respectively.
In the case of basis-independent source and long key limit, one can have [24],
δpx = ebz,
δpz = ebx.
(2)
After performing the error correction and privacy amplification, the final secure key length is
given by
NR≥ nsi f t − kec− kpr, (3)
where NR is the final secure key length, nsi f t is the sifted key length, kec is the secure-key cost
Table 1. List of measurement and post-processing results. After taking into account of error
correction and privacy amplification, we evaluate the final secure key length. The sifted key
length are nx and nz in the X and Z bases, respectively. The error correction efficiencies,
febx and febz, are evaluated by considering the low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and
progressive edge-growth (PEG) algorithm [23]. The failure probability εph in phase error
rate estimation processing is defined in [21]. The bit error rates in the X and Z bases are ebx
and ebz, respectively. Denote qact to be the experimental value of basis bias and qopt to be
the optimal value given by theoretical calculation.
Raw key nx nz febx febz εph θX
34644 1395 22300 1.1 1.12 6× 10−3 0.02
θZ ebx ebz qact qopt Final key Improvement
0.019 0.069 0.065 0.8 0.79 4293 14.8%
of error correction, and kpr is the secure-key cost of privacy amplification. In the efficiency
BB84 protocol, above parameters are given by,
nsi f t = nx + nz,
kec = nx f (ebx)H(ebx)+ nz f (ebz)H(ebz),
kpr = nxH(ebz +θz)+ nzH(ebx +θx),
(4)
where nx and nz are the number of sifted bits produced in the X and Z bases, respectively,
f (x) is the error correction inefficiency, and H(x) =−x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function. When Alice and Bob estimate the phase error rates in X and Z bases, θx and
θz are the corresponding deviations due to statistical fluctuations. We evaluate these deviations
as follows. Take Z basis as an example. Define the probability of epz > ebx +θx to be Pθx ,
Pθx <
√
nx + nz√
nxnzebx(1− ebx)
2−(nx+nz)ξx(θx) (5)
where ξx(θx) ≡ H(ebx + θx − qxθx)− qxH(ebx)− (1− qx)H(ebx + θx) with qx = nx/(nx + nz).
Similar results hold for Z-basis case, Pθz . Then the total failure probability of phase error rate
estimation, εph, is given by
εph ≤ Pθx +Pθz (6)
In the post processing, we obtain the error rates ebz, ebx and the raw key length N from the ex-
periment, and fixed the failure probability εph to be a small number. Here the failure probability
we chose for εph is 0.3% in both two bases X and Z.
The result is listed in Table 1. We use a bias of 20 : 80 (X : Z), which is close to the theoretical
optimal value of 21 : 79. In the asymptotic case, where the finite-key effect is neglected, the
final key size should achieve an 36% increase over the unbiased case [25]. After considering
the finite-key effect, we obtain a final key rate of 0.124 bit/raw key.
For comparison, we fix the raw key size to simulate the unbiased case by dividing equally
the sifted keys into two bases and keep all the other parameters unchanged and then we obtain
the final key rate of 0.108 bit/raw key. Hence, we increase the final key rate by 14.8% through
implementing the efficient BB84 protocol. Comparing to the infinite-key improvement of 36%,
one can see that the finite-key analysis does affect the QKD data postprocessing. The reason
for this gap is mainly due to the relatively small final key size (4293 bits in our experiment).
Therefore, we emphasize the importance of finite-key-size analysis, especially in the case of a
small final key size (such as < 105). This result is compatible to the theoretical simulations [21].
In fact, if we had obtained a longer key in our experiment (say, by extending the experimental
time or increasing the telescope aperture to reduce the channel loss), such as 1 Mbits raw
key, we could have achieved key-rate improvement of 71% (by taking a theoretical optimal
4 : 96 bias) over the unbiased case with the finite-key effect taken into account. Therefore, we
conclude that the efficient BB84 protocol is an effective way to increase the final secrete key
rate.
The final secure key rate is low in this experiment (about 0.42 bit/s). There are mainly two
reasons. First, the key rate is limited by the brightness of the entangled photon source. Recently,
a lot of efforts have been devoted to improve the brightness of entangled photon sources [26].
Second, the quantum efficiency of free-space channels are limited by the photon collection
efficiency, which are greatly affected by beam divergence and atmosphere turbulence. To im-
prove the photon collection efficiency, one can employ a wide-aperture telescope and equip a
high-frequency and high-accuracy acquiring, pointing and tracking system. Some of the im-
provement techniques have been experimental demonstrated recently [16].
4. Conclusion and discussions
We have experimentally demonstrated the free-space entanglement-based QKD with the ef-
ficient BB84 protocol. The final key rate in our biased basis setting is increased by 14.8%
comparing to the standard BB84 protocol, after considering the finite-key effect. The exper-
imental result suggests that the efficient BB84 protocol is indeed an easy and effective way
to increase the key rate for QKD. Moreover, the developed entanglement source, active basis
choice and synchronizing technology in this experiment are necessary components for future
satellite-based quantum communication.
Note that a couple of feasibility tests for ground-satellite QKD have been done recently
[15, 16], both of which employ the prepare-and-measure QKD protocol. Lately, another type
of scheme, the entanglement-based QKD where an entangled source is put in a satellite and
signals are transmitted to two ground stations via two quantum channels, attracts lots of research
interests [27, 28]. Considering that some properties (such as the channel lengths of 7.8 km and
the total channel loss of 50 dB) of our two free-space optical links are comparable to the down-
links between a low Earth orbit satellite and an optical ground station [29, 30], our experiment
can be regarded as a partial simulation of the entanglement-based ground-satellite QKD.
In our setup, the basis bias can be randomly modified in real-time. It is interesting to study
whether one can take advantage of this extra degree of freedom of basis choice. Also, the basis
is actively chosen in our setup, which allows us to apply four-state polarization analyzer [31] to
foil some quantum attacks, such as the time-shift attack [32,33] due to the efficiency mismatch
of detectors [34]. This can be done by adding one more PoC with 45◦ aligned to the optical
axis in Fig. 1. Since the single photon detectors operate continuously, one of the potential
advantages is that the attacking strategy presented in [35], called calibration loophole, is not
effective for our QKD system. Furthermore, the technique of actively choosing measurement
bases developed in this work can also be applied to other scientific experiments, such as the
fundamental tests of quantum mechanics — nonlocal correlation [36].
In a passive basis choice setting, such as the one used in [20], there is a potential drawback
compared to our active setting as we used here. In the passive setting, four detectors (two for
each basis) always open regardless of basis choices. Hence, when a large bias is used, the effect
of dark counts on the basis with a lower rate may increase. For example, suppose we use a bias
of 10:90 for the X /Z-basis, then the number of errors introduced by dark counts in X-basis is
10 times higher than the one in the active setting.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge Wei-Yue Liu, Yang Liu and Yan-Ling Tang for useful discussions in the er-
ror correction part. We thank Qiang Zhang, Yu-Ao Chen and Bo Zhao for their valuable sug-
gestions. This work has been supported by the National Fundamental Research Program (un-
der grant No. 2011CB921300 and No. 2013CB336800 ), the Chinese Academy of Sciences
and the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the National Basic Research Program
of China Grants No. 61073174, No. 61033001,No. 61061130540, No. 2011CBA00300 and
No. 2011CBA00301, the 1000 Youth Fellowship program and the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences.
